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Abstract
In 700/1301 the Cairene scholar Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Rifʿa wrote a short juridical treatise
entitled Kitāb al-nafāʾis fī adillat hadm al-kanāʾis in which he argued for the destruction of all
churches and synagogues in Cairo. Some chroniclers report that this text was used to legitimise popular attacks on and the destruction of churches, but shortly thereafter, Ibn alRifʿa’s opinion was declared invalid by a council of prominent jurists. In addition to its juridical arguments for church destruction, several statements found in the treatise suggest
that it was meant to function as a challenge to the author’s peers. I argue that al-Nafāʾis reflects ideas about the normative application of Shāfiʿī qh as much as it does about the destruction of churches, and that it can serve as a lens through which we can reconstruct a
complex picture of the performance and negotiation of legal authority in the Mamluk period.
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A rst version of this essay was presented at the 2017 Conference of the School of Mamluk Studies at the American
University of Beirut. I am grateful to Jo Van Steenbergen, Mohamed Maslouh, Luke Yarbrough, Mohamad El-Merheb,
and Maroussia Bednarkiewicz for their feedback on earlier iterations of the essay. The research has been funded by the
European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (KITAB,
grant agreement no. 772989)

i

f

i

f

1

Keywords
Ibn al-Rifʿa; disputation; Shāfiʿī qh; church destruction; polemics; Mamluk period.

In the year 700/1301 sumptuary regulations were imposed on non-Muslims in Cairo. These
regulations were reportedly instigated by a Maghrebi vizier exhorting the authorities to be
stricter in their attitude towards no-Muslims, but the measures also kickstarted a general
wave of anti-dhimmī actions across society. Some chronicles report that amidst these general
tensions a number of churches and synagogues were demolished. Donald P. Little has suggested that “the main source of anti-Coptic sentiment lay not with the Mamlūks […] but with
the general Muslim population of Cairo, especially with the lower elements of society.”2
More recently, Tamer el-Leithy argued that the mechanisms behind such waves of violence
were more complex, with different social groups participating in acts of “moral regulation”
by which they negotiated and performed religious identities.3 Little in fact highlighted this
complex interaction of social groups by noting a legal discussion that took place concerning
the destruction of churches in 700/1301:

2

D.P. Little, “Coptic Conversion to Islam under the Baḥrī Mamlūks, 692-755/1293-1354,” Bulletin of the School

of Oriental and African Studies 39:3 (1976), 552-69, at 557. He sketches the main historiographical information
about the events in 700/1301 on pages 554-8.
3

T. el-Leithy, “Sufis, Copts and the Politics of Piety: Moral Regulation in Fourteenth-Century Upper Egypt,” in

The Development of Su sm in Mamluk Egypt, ed. R. McGregor and A. Sabra (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie
Orientale, 2006), 75-118.
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[A] fatwā was issued by a deputy qāḍī in Cairo authorizing the destruction of the
churches of the city, but this was countermanded by a council of ʿulamāʾ who ruled
that all churches were to be left standing except those of recent construction. Although the churches were thereby spared, they were ordered to be closed and the
doors were nailed shut. The decree was also published in Alexandria, where the
Muslims hastened to destroy two churches which they claimed had been illegally
restored after the Muslim conquest; two churches were destroyed in Fayyūm as
well.4

The deputy qāḍī mentioned here is in fact known by name, and a version of the fatwā he wrote
exists in the form of a juridical treatise (kitāb). This short text was written by the Egyptian
Shāfiʿī scholar Najm al-Dīn ibn al-Rifʿa (d. 710/1310) and entitled Kitāb al-nafāʾis fī adillat
hadm al-kanāʾis (“The Book of Gems: Evidence for the Demolition of Churches”). The text
provides little information on the specific case that drove Ibn al-Rifʿa to write the treatise.
Instead the author takes the case of non-Muslim houses of worship in Cairo, which had been
built well after the Islamic conquest of Egypt, to argue more broadly that the demolition of
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Little, “Coptic Conversion,” 556.
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churches and synagogues is a matter of necessity if juridical norms are applied in ways that
he considers correct.5
Unlike a number of contemporary Mamluk agents, Ibn al-Rifʿa did not approach the
status of non-Muslims and their houses of worship from a polemical angle.6 Nor did he apply
his legal discussion exclusively to norms of Muslim-dhimmī social relations, as in other cases
where Islamic jurists disagreed over the status of non-Muslim houses of worship. In a famous
legal discussion about the synagogue of Tamanṭīṭ from the eighth/fifteenth century Maghreb
discussed at length by David Powers, for example, one of the sides is represented by opinions
that are not based on uṣūl al- qh but rather on “their sense of fairness.” The other side of the
debate maintained opinions based exclusively and strictly on legal norms concerning the
dhimma.7 As we shall see, Ibn al-Rifʿa approaches the discussion also strictly as one of legal
norms, but he uniquely does so from the angle of who should be plaintiff and who defendant
in a theoretical legal case on the status of the houses of worship brought to court for juridical
scrutiny. Ibn al-Rifʿa’s argumentation is as such highly performative in what it intends to
5

The author is careful to date the foundation of Cairo to the reign of the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz li-Dīn Allāh

(d. 365/975). He is thus not referring to the older settlement of Fusṭāṭ. However, he also refers to the Egyptian
lands in general throughout the treatise. Najm al-Dīn ibn al-Rifʿa, al-Nafāʾis fī adillat hadm al-kanāʾis, ed. Saʿd
ʿImād Saʿd al-Dīn al-Kaʿkī (Riyadh: Baynūna li‘l-nashr wa‘l-tawzīʿ, 1434/2013), 64.
6

For a thorough discussion of relevant polemical sources from the period, see L.B. Yarbrough, Friends of the

Emir: Non-Muslim State O cials in Premodern Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019),
219-260. As the title highlights, however, Yarbrough’s focus is on works specifically addressing the status of
non-Muslim state officials, so he does not discuss texts dealing with the status of non-Muslim houses of worship
in much detail.
7

D.S. Powers, “Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī”, in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists, ed. O. Arabi,

D.S. Powers & S.A. Spectorsky (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 375-399, at 384.
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produce: the field of legal contestation is framed as one in which agents representing opposing opinions needed to argue their case in the context of court where they should also take on
their concomitant legal roles.
This was not an opinion formulated by a radical agent at the margins of society: at the
time of writing Ibn al-Rifʿa was deputy judge (nāʾib al-ḥukm) to the Shāfiʿī chief judge Ibn
Daqīq al-ʿĪd (d. 702/1302) and he would later become market inspector (muḥtasib) of Fusṭāṭ.8
While his opinion may have been used as a pretext for the church destructions in Cairo, it
was not officially accepted by contemporary ʿulamāʾ, who instead followed Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd’s
judgment that a church should be left intact until it can be proven without a doubt to have
been built recently.
Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise has been studied by a handful of scholars in the context of the
communal conflicts recorded for the year 700/1301. Most of these scholars evaluate the text
as a polemical juridical text on church destruction, relying only on paraphrases of the original
text. In this essay I argue that the author’s argument has been partly misrepresented and that
scholars have left the text’s rich layer of semiotics and literary performance virtually unstudied. Additionally, the wealth of information related to the text’s genesis and repercussions in
the contemporary historical literature deserves to be looked at more carefully. By means of a
close reading of the treatise and relevant historical information taken from chronicles and bi-
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Ibn al-Rifʿa is the first muḥtasib listed in Aḥmad ʿAbd ar-Rāziq’s “Les muḥtasibs de Fosṭāṭ au temps des mam-

lūks," Annales islamologiques/Ḥawlīyāt Islāmīyah 14 (1978), 128-9. According to Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d.
852/1449), he took up the position after stepping down as deputy judge, shortly after the events discussed in this
article. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa l-thāmina, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl,
1414/1993), 1:286.
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ographical dictionaries, I argue that Ibn al-Rifʿa was not only making an argument about the
legality of destroying churches, but also using this argument to negotiate his position vis-àvis his peers and to participate in discussions concerning who should have the right to formulate legal opinions and in what way. These claims furthermore seem to have had repercussions in the context of power struggles among the leading ʿulamāʾ, which eventually turned
out negatively for Ibn al-Rifʿa himself.
Inspired by Michael Chamberlain’s analysis of Ayyubid and early Mamluk biographical dictionaries, I will argue that legal literature was an arena of significant social negotiation
and that one way to achieve a better understanding of these processes is to consider the ‘literary’ and rhetorical ways in which authors construct their arguments.9 Ibn al-Rifʿa was not
merely unhappy with the ways in which rules (ḥukm, pl. aḥkām) were formulated by his colleagues, but also claiming superior knowledge of the principles and techniques of rule-formulation (tarjīḥ) in his madhhab. He made this claim by showcasing his grasp of the legal subject
matter and by constructing an elaborate rhetorical structure. This is not to say that Ibn al-Rifʿa
used his juridical knowledge only for social advancement, but that the ways in which he
framed his argument expose social anxieties that transcend the inter-communal tensions that
typically are advanced as an explanation for the proliferation of polemical writing in the early
9

M. Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1994). On juridical disputation (jadal, munāẓara), I have benefited from Walter Edward Young’s
The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law (Cham, Springer: 2016). Whereas
Young’s work is concerned with intellectual theory, Chamberlain stresses the social interactions of ʿulamāʾ —
claiming that institutional structures were usually no more than “practices of social competition." Chamberlain,
Knowledge and Social Practice, 6. In this essay, I try to bridge the gap between the theoretical-analytical approach
to Islamic law and the anthropologically inspired evaluation of law as social practice.
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Mamluk period. As I shall argue here, power struggles among the ʿulamāʾ in Cairo at a time of
considerable political and juridical instability must also be taken into account.10

Author and text
All Mamluk-era biographical lemmas about Ibn al-Rifʿa praise his contributions to the formulation of Islamic law, especially within the Shāfīʿī madhhab.11 Not much is known about
his personal life, although some biographies anecdotally attest to his prominence in contemporary juridical circles. We are, for example, told that Ibn al-Rifʿa was chosen to debate Ibn
Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) on an undefined issue, and that when the debate was over the latter
praised him for his excellent knowledge of Shāfiʿī qh.12 In addition to the treatise on church

10

Luke Yarbrough has argued that the production of polemical literature in the early Mamluk period functioned

along similar lines, arguing that these “works of advice (naṣīḥa) written against non-Muslim officials by ʿulamāʾ,
acting as de facto amici curiae, constituted implicit self-promotion as well as reminders of certain Islamic juristic
dogmas concerning non-Muslim officials.” Yarbrough, “‘A rather small genre’: Arabic Works Against NonMuslim State Officials," Der Islam 93:1 (2016), 139-69, at 163-64. It should be noted, however, that there is no
evidence of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s text circulating amongst members of the ruling elite.
11

See for a summary of sources: Al-Nafāʾis, 29-32.

12

The authenticity of this anecdote, which is found in most biographical lemmas from the Mamluk period, was

subsequently disputed by the Yemeni scholar Muḥammad al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1839), al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ bi-maḥāsin
man baʿd al-qarn al-tāsiʿ, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-islāmī, s.d.), 1:116-17. Note that al-Shawkānī disparages
Ibn al-Rifʿa as a “muqallid” while calling Ibn Taymiyya a “mujtahid." I will discuss the significance of these
terms below. Al-Shawkānī’s attitude towards taqlīd and ijtihād has been discussed briefly by Fekry Ibrahim in his
"Rethinking the Taqlīd-Ijtihād Dichotomy: A Conceptual-Historical Approach," Journal of the American Oriental
Society 136:2 (2016), 301-2.
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qh works. One of these, his commentary on al-Shirāzī al-Fīrūzābādī’s (d. 471/1083) Kitāb alTanbīh, has been published.14 His commentary on al-Ghazālī’s (d. 595/1111) al-Wasīṭ fī l-madhhab remains unedited.15 In addition to his legal writings, Ibn al-Rifʿa also seems to have
composed some poetry. None of his biographers quote any of this, but Livnat Holtzman has
argued that he was one of six ʿulamāʾ participants in a high-profile poetical discussion on predetermination ostensibly instigated by a non-Muslim. Holtzman identified Ibn al-Rifʿa as the
poet writing under the pseudonym Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.16
Al-Nafāʾis survives today in full in at least two manuscripts held, respectively, by the
Azhar Library in Egypt (al-Azhar 49091/Majāmīʿ 1003) and the Chester Beatty Library in
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Four manuscripts of this text are held in the Dār al-Kutub wa‘l-Wathāʾiq in Cairo, and another copy is held in

the Chester Beatty Library, in the same manuscript that contains a copy of the text on church destruction (see
below). The text has been edited on the basis of the Egyptian manuscripts by Muḥammad Aḥmad Ismāʿīl alKhārūf, al-Īḍāḥ wa‘l-tabāyun fī l-mikyāl wa‘l-mīzān (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1400/1980).
14

Ibn al-Rifʿa, Kifāyat al-nabīh fī sharḥ al-tanbīh, 22 vols., ed. M.M.S. Bāsalūm (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya,

2009). This edition is based on a collation of three incomplete sets of manuscripts held by the Azhar library and
the Dār al-Kutub wa‘l-Wathāʾiq, both in Cairo.
15

Ibn al-Rifʿa refers to the Tanbīh and the Wasīṭ a few times as authoritative sources in al-Nafāʾis, 68, 81, 83. Ibn

al-Rifʿa’s commentary on the Wasīt was praised by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī as “an abundantly and exhaustively
documented commentary (sharḥan ḥā lan mushtamalan), full of reports, legal deductions (takhrījāt), objections
(iʿtirāḍāt), and inexorable concessions (ilzāmāt), [all of which] attest to his copious [grasp of the] subject matter
and the abundance of his knowledge and the strength of his understanding.” Al-durar al-kāmina, 1:286.
16

L. Holtzman, “The Dhimmi’s Question on Predetermination and the Ulama’s Six Responses: The Dynamics

of Composing Polemical Didactic Poems in Mamluk Cairo and Damascus,” Mamluk Studies Review 16 (2012), 154, at 19. Her translation of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s long poem is at pp. 45-51.
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destruction, he wrote a treatise about weights and measures,13 and two large commentaries on

Dublin (CBL Ar 4664). The Azhar manuscript was copied during the author’s lifetime: it is
dated precisely to the afternoon of 26 Shaʿbān 700 / 6 May 1301, which, as we shall see, is
very close to the date given by one chronicler for a council in which Ibn al-Rifʿa’s opinion
was discussed by prominent jurists.17 It generally preserves the fullest and grammatically
more correct version of the text.18 The text was at some point bound with four other codicological units into a composite volume.19 The Chester Beatty manuscript, doubtless a later
copy, is a cheaply produced miscellany containing three short texts, copied by one and the
same hand. The manuscript begins with Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise on weights and measures, followed by al-Nafāʾis, and it concludes with a treatise entitled Risālat al-ṭaʿn fī maqālat al-ṭaʿn by!

17

MS Maktabat al-Azhar 49091/Majāmīʿ 1003, 22v.

18

This manuscript was originally a separate volume of twenty-two folios, with an elaborate frontispiece, and

only thirteen lines per page (on a writing surface of approximately 17 x 12 cm). The published catalogue notes
only that the writing surface is 17 cm. Fihris al-kutub al-mawjūda bi‘l-maktaba l-Azhariyya ilā sana 1364/1945, 9 vols.
(Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Azhar, 1365/1946), 2:625. The Azhar Library’s on-site digital catalogue specifies a width of
12 cm.
19

Three of these units deal with broadly similar subject matter: a treatise entitled Kitāb Sirāj al-ẓulma fī sharḥ

ḥuqūq ahl al-dhimma (“The lamp of darkness in the commentary on the rights of the dhimmī’s”) (folios 23a-36b),
which is not attributed to an author but is basically a compilation of various versions of the so-called Pact of
ʿUmar; an unattributed extract from Ibn al-Naqqāsh’ al-Madhamma fī istiʿmāl ahl al-dhimma (folios 38a-69a); and
a short fatwā composed by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (folios 70a-78a) on the issue of a monks (dāriyīn) owning part
of a waqf in Khalīl/Hebron, with a colophon dated Dhū l-Qaʿda 839/May-June 1436. The concluding two texts
of the manuscript must be studied in more detail to establish with greater precision their relationship to the initial texts. I am using manuscript terminology in accordance with M. Friedrich and C. Schwarke, who, quoting
Peter Gumbert, define “the miscellany as ‘written by one person in one process’ and the composite as the result of
joining ‘wholly different items’”. Codicological units are “a discret[e] number of quires, worked in a single operation [...] containing a complete text or set of texts.” One-Volume Libraries: Composite and Multi-Text Manuscripts
(Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 8.
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the Syrian chief qāḍī ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 729/1329).20 The manuscript does not have a
colophon but appears to have been compiled after Ibn al-Rifʿa’s death, as it refers to the author as a deceased person. This copy of the text is less grammatically correct than the one
found in the Azhar manuscript and omits some material, but it also contains some unique material, including a seventeen-line passage missing from the Azhar manuscript. The passage
clears up some confusion about the transition from the first aspect of the argument to its
second aspect, although the transition from the second to the third aspect remains unclear.21 A
third version of the text is found in Kashf al-dasāʾis fī tarmīm al-kanāʾis, a treatise written by
Taqī l-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) in 754/1353, in which he included an extensive paraphrase
(mulakhkhaṣ) of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s text as an appendix.22 Later in the same year al-Subkī wrote a
closely related work, Īḍāh Kashf al-dasāʾis fī tarmīm al-kanāʾis, in which he also paraphrased
and ultimately rebutted Ibn al-Rifʿa’s argument.23

20

I have found no further data on the risāla by al-Qunāwī. The Chester Beatty library catalogue describes it as

“a tract on maledictions." A.J. Arberry, The Chester Beatty Library: A Handlist of the Arabic Manuscripts, 8 vols.
(Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & co., 1963), 6:50-51.
21

An incongruity between the catchword (wa-warada hiya) of folio 6v of the Dublin excerpt and the first word

(baʿḍ) of folio 7r suggests that even more of the text is missing. In his edition, al-Kaʿkī has rendered this catchword and the first word of 7r as a continuous sentence. However, if this is indeed another gap, none of this material is attested in the al-Aqṣā manuscript (see next note), where only four aspects are explicitly mentioned.
22

MS Al-Aqṣā 1466, ff. 29r-32v, in https://eap.bl.uk/archive-file/EAP521-1-13 last accessed on 12 February

2019.
23

On these works, their contents and their relationship, see Ward, “Construction and Repair of Churches and

Synagogues in Islamic Law: A Treatise by Taqī Al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd Al-Kāfī Al-Subkī” (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale University: 1984), 2-26.
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The edition of the text prepared by Saʿd ʿImād Saʿd al-Dīn al-Kaʿkī generally follows
the Azhar manuscript, but notes variant and additional material from the Chester Beatty manuscript. The edition is only critical to some degree: it does not mark corresponding manuscript folios in the body text and consistently corrects grammatical mistakes and non-standard orthography, but it does include an extensive and useful critical apparatus.24 Digital
copies of the Azhar manuscript as well as an earlier, unpublished edition of the Azhar manuscript by Jamāl ʿAbdallāh ʿUwayḍa circulate widely on internet message boards, where the
text has been discussed by some on-line users.25
Some western scholars have studied al-Nafāʾis’ arguments for the destruction of
Cairo’s churches as an example of juridical polemics against non-Muslims in the early Mamluk period. Seth Ward has summarised the text’s main legal arguments and contextualised
these in relation to socio-religious tensions of the late 13th and early 14th centuries and to the
debates among scholars on the legality of maintaining and repairing church buildings. He
emphasised that while Ibn al-Rifʿa’s was “usually rejected at least in part, [it] became a stan-

24

I did not think it appropriate to publish my own edition of the text considering the existence of al-Kaʿkī’s

edition, but I have submitted my edition to the digital OpenITI corpus (https://github.com/OpenITI), where it
will be freely available to scholars. I am grateful to Mohamad Maslouh for his thorough proofreading.
25

Abū Salāma, “‘al-Nafāʾis fī adillat hadm al-kanāʾis’ li-Ibn al-Rifʿa, li’l-Shāmila wa-Wūrd” https://www.ah-

lalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=230933 last consulted 20 February 2019. Note the following post contextualising Ibn Taymiyya’s contemporary writing on churches and comparing it to Ibn al-Rifʿa’s text: Muḥammad
Barāʾ, “Al-naẓr al-tārīkhī wa’l-maṣlaḥī fī fatwā Ibn Taymiyya fī kanāʾis al-Qāhira (sana 700 h[ijriyya])” in
http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=361240 last consulted 20 February 2019.
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dard for arguments against the retention of places and worship of non-Muslims.”26 After discussing its contents, he also noted that:

Ibn al-Rif`a's work is significant […] both for the role it actually played in providing
justification for a rampage of destruction and closure of many churches and synagogues in the early years of the fourteenth century, but also exemplifying a spirit of
harsher interpretation of the traditions in such a way as to work against dhimmī interests.27

While Ward’s evaluation of the legal core of the text is sound, the study is hampered by it being based exclusively on Taqī l-Dīn al-Subkī’s summary presentation, which only retains the
treatise’s legal argument.28 Two aspects which are much less pronounced in al-Subkī‘s
abridgement will be central to my argument below: Ibn al-Rifʿa’s tendency to return to the
issue of the correct deduction of substantive law from statements made by al- Shāfiʿī, and the
regular use of rhyming cadenced prose (sajʿ). Furthermore, as will be argued below, Ward’s
evaluation of the text as “work[ing] against dhimmī interests” is too limited to understand the
full scope of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s intentions. A close analysis of the text’s rhetorical structure and

26

S. Ward, “Ibn al-Rifʿa on the Churches and Synagogues of Cairo,” Medieval Encounters 5:1 (1999), 70-84 at

71. Ward only notes al-Subkī’s engagement with the text as proof for this “standard” claim. I have come across
no other references to it in legal literature.
27

Ward, “Ibn al-Rifʿa”, 83.

28

Ward was aware of the Azhar manuscript’s existence but was not able to procure a copy of it. Ward, “Ibn al-

Rifʿa”, 78.
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the historical information provided by contemporary and later chroniclers will show that
more complex social relations were at work.
Other scholars have discussed the text only briefly. Kristen Stilt consulted the Azhar
manuscript and briefly presented its general argument as one example of a muḥtasib’s engagement with non-Muslims, but she did not go into much further detail.29 In his study of religious tensions in Upper Egypt Tamer el-Leithy made use of the text as paraphrased in Seth
Ward’s article, but his main focus was a Sufi text written by Ibn Nūḥ al-Qūṣī as well as a
number of contemporary polemical treatises. Ibn Nūḥ’s Sufi text does refer favourably to Ibn
al-Rifʿa’s treatise as an authoritative source supporting his case — al-Qūṣī was arrested on
the charge of leading people in destroying thirteen churches in Qūṣ in 707/1307 — but he
does not explicitly quote from it, nor does he discuss any of its finer details.30
While it is useful to read this treatise in conjunction with polemical texts and historical information about the tensions in which it originated, it is important to note that the contents of al-Nafāʾis differ in good part from contemporary polemical texts. For example, the
typical anecdotes and aḥādīth about misbehaving Jews or Christians, a mainstay of such
29

K. Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2012), 115. Stilt does not mention that Ibn al-Rifʿa likely did not yet hold this position when
he wrote his treatise.
30

T. el-Leithy, “Sufis, Copts and the Politics of Piety”, 106, 115-17. The relevant section from Ibn Nūḥ al-

Qūṣī’s text has been edited and translated by Denis Gril in “Une émeute anti-chrétienne à Qūṣ au début du
VIIIe/XIVe siècle,” Annales Islamologiques 16 (1980), 241-74. Ibn Nūḥ first refers to the treatise as a fatwā and
uses it as a source to support the claim that the Egyptian lands had been conquered by force — interestingly, he
writes here that Ibn al-Rifʿa transmitted this information on the authority of Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd and on that of Mālik’s Mudawwana. Further on he refers to the treatise as a “muṣannaf” (a “work”) on church destruction, but he
does not discuss its contents in any detail. “Une émeute anti-chrétienne”, 247, 249.
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polemical texts, are entirely absent from Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise, and only two of the quoted
Qurʾānic verses refer directly to non-Muslims. Furthermore, while the author frequently
refers to Jews and Christians and their houses of worship, he usually addresses these references to a group of people whose interests are indirectly defended by his opponents, that is,
fellow jurists within the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Nor was he addressing the political authorities, as
Yarbrough has argued with regard to contemporary polemical treatises. Instead, Ibn al-Rifʿa
apparently considered the final decision concerning the churches to lay entirely with the ʿulamāʾ — as will be shown, there is an interesting tension between Ibn al-Rifʿa’s portrayal of
this issue and the historical information which presents a more complex interaction of state
agents and the ʿulamāʾ, which in itself highlights the tension between Ibn al-Rifʿa’s idealised
conception of juridical decision-making and the social realities behind many actual decisions.
The treatise’s main argument revolves around the question of who bears the burden of
proving the building date of the churches in Cairo, which was founded long after the region
was conquered by Muslims.31 By scrutinising standard works of Shāfiʿī qh on the question
of plaintiff and defendant,32 Ibn al-Rifʿa concludes that the widespread opinion that those
who want to demolish a church or synagogue should first provide evidence for the building’s
recent construction, is mistaken. As Seth Ward notes, “Islamic law provides that plaintiffs
have the burden of proof”, so it follows that those who want to preserve the churches are the
plaintiffs in this case and they should present proof that the building was constructed before

31

For a longer summary, see Ward, “Ibn al-Rifʿa”, 79-82.

32

Al-Kaʿkī identifies the major Shāfiʿī authors — especially Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī —

and the ways in which Ibn al-Rifʿa developed their arguments. Al-Nafāʾis, 42-43. See also the editor’s notes
throughout the text, where he identifies all named works and authors.
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the Arab conquests.33 As we shall see, however, and contrary to what Ward suggest, the plaintiff and defendant can not be equated with non-Muslims and ʿulamāʾ respectively, because Ibn
al-Rifʿa suggests that ʿulamāʾ are represented on both sides. The main argument is developed
in the first two “aspects” (wajh, pl. awjah) of five, mostly based on legal deduction (takhrīj)
from statements by al-Shāfiʿī and the Prophet, and illustrated by several comparative cases.
One example concerns a married non-Muslim couple who both convert to Islam, but it is not
certain if the conversions took place simultaneously, which would have implications for the
marriage. Other examples concern the use of the divorce oath (al-ḥilf bi‘l-ṭalāq) and a slave
who was purchased and later found to have a physical defect.34 Ibn al-Rifʿa discusses all of
these cases in the context of the question about who should be plaintiff and who should be
defendant. Subsequently, Ibn al-Rifʿa turns to the question of peace agreements with Egyptian non-Muslims, first as a general practice of concluding peace agreements (third aspect)
and then more specifically the so-called Pact of ʿUmar (fourth aspect). Finally he loops back
to his discussion of plaintiff and defendant in the framework of these agreements (fifth aspect). He argues first that there was no such agreement for Egypt, and second that even if
there was one, the regulations for the social position of non-Muslims stipulated in these
agreements have been illegally transferred from those who agreed to the Pact in ʿUmar’s time
to the present day. In fact, Ibn al-Rifʿa argues, non-Muslim communities should have either
negotiated a new contract or converted to Islam. Furthermore, to negotiate such a new contract, they would have to perform their role as plaintiffs and demonstrate that they had not
33

Ward, “Ibn al-Rifʿa”, 80.

34

On the frequent use of examples concerning divorce oaths in legal literature, see Y. Rapoport, Marriage,

Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89ff and the references cited there.
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contravened the stipulations. By returning to this matter of plaintiff and defendant, the text’s
argumentation comes full circle.

The historical context
While many chronicles provide information on sumptuary regulations of the year 700/1301,
and some mention that churches were demolished, only a handful of historians inform us
about Ibn al-Rifʿa’s actions.35 Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā al-Yūnīnī (d. 726/1326), Muḥammad ibn
Shākir al-Kutubī (d. 764/1363), and Taqī l-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) all
mention the council which, as Donald Little notes, “countermanded” Ibn al-Rifʿa’s opinion.
Of these historians, only the Syrian al-Yūnīnī was a contemporary of the events. His account,
which is paraphrased by al-Kutubī,36 runs as follows:

Then […] in Cairo [some jurists] prescribed (sharaʿū) the destruction of churches,
especially the churches in Cairo [itself]. The jurists (fuqahāʾ) and judges gathered for
35

No contemporary Egyptian historian, e.g. Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 725/1325), Ibn Aybak al-Dawādārī (d. after

736/1335), and al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333), mentions the council.
36

Al-Kutubī’s account may have been copied from Shams al-Dīn al-Jazarī’s (d. 738/1337-8) account. Al-Jaz-

arī’s reports of the immediately preceding year (his chronicle Ḥawādith al-zamān survives only in defective form
and its first part ends in 699/1299) are closely related to those of al-Yūnīnī. L. Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian historiography: Al-Y n n 's Dhayl Mir' t al-zam n (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 94. The relevant section from al-Kutubī recently
has been edited in ʻUy n al-taw r kh: ʻa r sal

n al-mam l k, 3 vols., ed. A mad ʻAbd al-Satt r and Ayman Fuʼ d

Sayyid (Cairo: Ma baʻat D r al-Kutub wa‘l-Wath ʼiq al-Qawm yah bi'l-Q hirah, 2017). I have not been able to
consult this edition and I base my observation on MS Istanbul Topkapı Saray, Ahmed III 2922, vol. 22, fol. 99v.
I am grateful to Luke Yarbrough for bringing this version of the account to my attention.
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ī

ī
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this reason, and they mentioned that the judge, Najm al-Dīn ibn al-Rifʿa, deputy
judge (nāʾib al-ḥukm) in Fusṭāṭ (Miṣr), had issued a fatwā calling for their destruction
(qad aftā bi-hadmi-hā). When the judges and ʿulamāʾ gathered, they discussed and investigated [the issue] for some time, and then the chief judge Taqī l-Dīn Muḥammad
ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd spoke and issued a fatwā that [the churches and synagogues] should
be left as they are unless proof were now given that they had been built recently, and
[only] if this was established, should they be destroyed. Those gathered (al-jamāʿa)
agreed with him, and none of those who were present in the gathering disagreed with
him. The situation was resolved according to what the shaykh Taqī l-Dīn ibn Daqīq
al-ʿĪd said.37

The ninth/fifteenth century historian al-Maqrīzī’s account gives a slightly different version of
the events in his chronicle al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk. As the tends to do elsewhere for
this period, he enlivens the narrative and adds information of unknown provenance:

The common people laid their hands on the churches of the Christians and [the synagogues of] the Jews, destroying them in accordance with a fatwā by the shaykh and
jurist Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Rifʿa. The emirs then asked the

37

al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl mirʾat al-zamān, 5 vols., ed. Ḥamza ʿAbbās (Abū Ẓabī: Hayʾat Abū Ẓabī li’l-thaqāfa wa‘l-

turāth, 2007), 1:463-64. This account is reproduced verbatim by the anonymous chronicler whose work was
edited by K.V. Zetterstéen in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlukensultane in den Jahren 690–741 der Higra nach Arabischen Handschriften (Leiden: Brill, 1919), 84-93.
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qāḍīs and the jurists to investigate the case of the churches (amr al-kanāʾis). [When
they were gathered,] Ibn al-Rifʿa made a statement about the necessity of destroying
them, but the [chief] qāḍī, Taqī l-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd, forbade this. He
alleged that if proof can be provided that [the churches and synagogues] had been
built [after the installation of] Islamic rule (fī l-islām) they should be destroyed, but if
[such evidence can] not [be provided], no one should interfere with them. The remaining [judges and jurists] agreed with him concerning this and [then] dispersed.38

Two additions are important in al-Maqrīzī’s version: the statement that it was the common
people (al-ʿāmma) who destroyed the churches, and the fact that the judges and jurists are said
to have convened at the request of “the emirs.” While the former suggests that in one way or
another ʿulamāʾ controlled or directed the populace, the latter raises questions about the locus
of political decision-making concerning these matters. This latter observation resonates in
interesting ways with Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise: as noted above, the author never refers to the political authorities and suggests that these decisions are entirely in the hands of the leading ʿulamāʾ.
Most accounts of this episode do not mention a council (or church destructions) at all.
Instead, they indicate that the decision to impose sumptuary laws on non-Muslims was made
by the two leading emirs, Baybars al-Jāshnikīr (d. 709/1310) and Salār (d. 709/1310) — both

38

al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat al-duwal wa‘l-mulūk, 8 vols., ed. M.ʿA.ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya,

n.d.), 2:338-39. My translation is based on Bernard Lewis’ translation in: Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to
the Capture of Constantinople, vol. 2: Religion and Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 229-32, at 231.
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of whom dominated the political landscape during sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s second reign
(698-708/1299-1309) — at the instigation of an enigmatic Maghrebi vizier.39 Whereas Ibn alRifʿa disregarded the ‘political’ treatment of dhimma-related subjects and implicitly argued
that this subject should be the domain of the religious scholars, al-Yūnīnī and later historians
suggest a more complex handling of such matters in which the political authorities would
consult with religious scholars. Both the treatise and these historical excerpts thus participated in wider debates about the relationship between siyāsa and sharīʿa. Yet the discussion is
deeply ambiguous, considering the fact that all these scholars, not in the least Ibn al-Rifʿa
himself, held a number of state-appointed offices throughout their lives.
The accounts allow us to formulate some ideas about the dating of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s text:
apparently, a fatwā that he wrote justifying church destruction in Cairo was overturned by a
council of judges and jurists. One may infer that al-Nafāʾis is the fatwā referred to by the historians. The dates given in al-Yūnīnī’s account may corroborate this run of events: he mentions
that the council convened after the proclamation of the edict prescribing the wearing of
coloured turbans in Damascus on 25 Shaʿbān 700/ 5 May 1301. That his account of the council begins with the word thumma (“then, thereupon”) suggests that the council took place after this date, probably after 26 Shaʿbān / 6 May, which, as noted above, is the copying date
given in the Azhar manuscript’s colophon. The chronology of events thus may have been as
follows: after the edict’s proclamation, Ibn al-Rifʿa issued a fatwā, or wrote the treatise as we
have it. Then a number of churches were demolished. The council then gathered to discuss
this controversy, possibly at the request of the political authorities. However, the treatise’s

39

These accounts are not mutually exclusive: the Maghrebi vizier is also mentioned by the historians I quoted.
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contents complicate this chronology: as we shall see, the author seems to argue against unspecified earlier rulings concerning the churches of Cairo. If we take these rulings to have
been those of the council, the council must have convened earlier than what al-Yūnīnī tells
us, and Ibn al-Rifʿa may have revised the text to state his case for a wider (or perhaps the
same) public. Alternatively, the council may only have confirmed the outcome of a debate
that had been ongoing for some time, in which Ibn al-Rifʿa hoped to convince other jurists of
his opinion.
In my view, the latter hypothesis is the most likely option, but information given by
the famous tenth / seventeenth century Ottoman bibliographer Kâtip Çelebi (also known as
Ḥajjī Khalīfa) points to yet another possibility: in his Kashf al-ẓunūn, Çelebi refers to the work
by its present title and claims that it is a mukhtaṣar (abridgement) of the 700/1301 fatwā,
completed in 707/1307-8.40 This date, of course, does not agree with the information found in
the colophon, and may have been incorrectly inferred from the colophon of another manuscript. The text’s general construction does indeed suggest that it may not be the original
version, and it most certainly does not follow the structure of a fatwā. Furthermore, the appearance of two introductions in the text is somewhat unusual: the first one is present in both
manuscripts of the full text with some variation, but almost entirely absent from al-Subkī’s
paraphrase.41 The first introduction is also written in dense rhyming prose and contains a
rhetorical development of the treatise’s general case of contention of legal authority, while
the second is much shorter, composed in less elaborate but still rhyming prose, and leads di-

40

Ward, “Ibn al-Rifʿa,” 78. Note that this is the same year in which the thirteen churches in Qūṣ were demol-

ished, an act in which Ibn Nūḥ al-Qūṣī, who referred favourably to Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise, was implicated.
41

The textual variation between these versions is however also found in other parts of the text.
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rectly to the treatise’s core legal argument.42 The fact that we find a very similar version of
the basmallah in Ibn al-Rifʿa’s text on weights and measures raises a number of further questions concerning its authorship.43 However, even if the basmallah was a later addition, the
general introduction was clearly composed in such a way that it would resonate with the treatise’s main argument. While acknowledging the problematic status of the introduction as far
as authorship is concerned, in the following I will consider it as a meaningful part of the treatise’s textual history, and indeed, as the key to understand the text’s general orientation.

Performing knowledge
The first introduction follows the common structure of basmallah (invocation) and taḥmīd
(laudatory preamble), followed by the ammā baʿd (incipit), after which the main elements of
the discussion and the reasons for the composition of the text are introduced. As in much contemporary writing, the invocation and preamble provide important information concerning
the author’s intentions. Ibn al-Rifʿa makes veiled statements against his opponents and cites

42

Ibn al-Rif’a’s use of rhymed prose is a good example of what Thomas Bauer has called “a process of ‘ula-

maization of adab’ […] counterbalanced by a process of ‘adabization of the ulama’." Bauer, “Mamluk Literature:
Misunderstandings and New Approaches,” Mamlūk Studies Review 9:2 (2005), 105-32, at 108. Ward does not discuss the introduction to al-Nafāʾis due to its absence from al-Subkī’s abridgement. It is given some attention by
the editor al-Kaʿkī, al-Nafāʾis, 39.
43

Ibn al-Rifʿa, al-Īḍāḥ wa‘l-tabāyun fī l-mikyāl wa‘l-mīzān, 43.
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verses of the Qurʾān that resonate with the rhetorical structure of the treatise.44 The basmallah
focuses squarely on the author’s agency:

In the name of God the Beneficent the Merciful, Lord of Provision. [What follows
was] said [by] our master and helper, the sheikh, the imam, the authority of Islam,
the muftī of mankind, [the one who embodies] the goodness of the umma, the authority of the Imams, the most decisive judge, the sun of the sharīʿa, unique in his epoch,
the only one of his kind, the star of the religion, the sheikh of the compilers, the representative of the commander of the faithful, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad
ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Rifʿa al-Anṣārī al-Shāfiʿī. May God grant him His abundant grace as
clothing (afāḍa Allāh ʿalay-hi malābis faḍli-hi l-jazīl), and may these clothes not become
worn out nor dwindle away, and [may He] preserve [for] him the continuation of His
beautiful remembering, to fill the earth with knowledge and justice.45

This is not simply an invocation of God, but a claim to superiority based on the specific request for God’s aid to the author, who is introduced with flowery epithets indicating that he
should be considered the leading scholar of his time. As we shall see, these epithets were not
innocent or common. Rather, they situate Ibn al-Rifʿa within a competitive field in which
leading ʿulamāʾ were the major agents. As noted, it is not unlikely that this was not written by

44

Ibn al-Rifʿa’s introductions to other works also showcase this rhetorical interweaving of citations and rhymed

prose. Kifāyat al-nabīh, 1:99-100; al-Īḍāḥ wa‘l-tabāyun, 43-47
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al-Nafāʾis, 61.
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the author himself, but if so, the person who composed it clearly picked up on the tone of
knowledge contestation of the rest of the treatise and presented its author as a superior jurist.
The next part of the introduction is the taḥmīd. As Aziz Qutbuddin has argued, the
taḥmīd was not “a mundane convention” but a literary form that has a strong “capacity to incorporate multiple layers of meanings that are artfully presented within the confines of the
convention.”46 Compared to the above-quoted basmallah, the taḥmīd section of al-Nafāʾis is
very short. However, it does make a significant choice in quoting Qurʾān 9:73: “O Prophet!
Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be harsh with them! Their refuge is
Hell. What an evil journey’s end!” The reference to unbelievers (ku fār) in this verse suggests
that it was chosen to refer to the Christians and Jews whose churches should be demolished,
but the use of the term ‘hypocrites’ (munā qūn) makes the attack more ambiguous. The author refrains from explaining the choice for this verse, but knowledge of the text’s main argument and relevant historical information suggests that he may have been alluding to his
fellow jurists who delivered what he considered to be incorrect rulings here. In his edition alKaʿkī notes that it was chosen in the spirit of the rhetorical strategy of barāʿat al-maṭlab and
barāʿat al-istihlāl (felicitous and allusive openings), but he refrains from defining the possible

46

A. Qutbuddin, “A Literary Analysis of Taḥmīd: A Relational Approach for Studying the Arabic-Islamic Laud-
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reasons for it.47 If we turn to exegesis of this verse, the tafsīrs of al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1272) and
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), both of which were highly regarded in Ibn al-Rifʿa’s
time, are enlightening. They both note that the “striving” (jahada) of the verse may be understood as “the use of force or the power of persuasion.”48 Considering the nature of the text’s
argumentation which was intended to persuade fellow jurists of the author’s opinion, and the
historical context in which churches were forcefully demolished, this is a meaningful choice.
In the following parts of the introduction similar choices are made to underline the
targeting of both non-Muslims and fellow jurists. After the ammā baʿd, Ibn al-Rifʿa links the
dual opponents to two central commands:

The foundation of religion and the symbol of the devout (qiwām al-dīn wa-shiʿār almuttaqīn) is, [on the one hand], compliance with the practices of the favoured
47

al-Nafāʾis, 61. I take the translations of these terms from Pierre Cachia’s translation and systematisation of

ʿAbd al-Ghanī l-Nābuls’īs (d. 1143/1731) Nafaḥāt al-azhār ʿalā naṣamāt al-aṣhār in The Arch Rhetorician, or, The
Schemer’s Skimmer: A Handbook of Late Arabic badīʿ, ed. and transl. P. Cachia (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 78.
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The Study Quran, ed. S.H. Nasr et al. (New York: HarperOne, 2015), 526. All translations in this essay are

taken from this Quran translation. On contemporary evaluations of al-Rāzī by al-Ṣafadī (positive) and Ibn Taymiyya (negative), see G.C. Anawati, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," EI2. Al-Qurṭubī was a Mālikī scholar and it may
thus be tenuous to claim that Ibn al-Rifʿa, a staunch Shāfiʿī, would be familiar with this tafsīr, but he does show
a keen knowledge of Mālikī tenets throughout this treatise. In the list of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s masters (shuyūkh), compiled by al-Kaʿkī, several are Mālikī or have a Mālikī connection — including Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d.
682/1283 or 684/1285). al-Nafāʾis, 24-27. On al-Qarāfī, see S. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Shihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
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prophets (ittibāʿ sunan al-anbiyāʾ al-muqarrabīn) – the blessings of God be upon them
all – and the imitation of the writings of the chosen ʿulamāʾ, and, [on the other hand,]
the evasion of the worst of enemies: the deniers who belong to the people of disunity, those who stubbornly resist (ahl al-shuqāq al-muʿānidīn).49

Following this, Ibn al-Rifʿa again cites the Qurʾān to develop this argument, interweaving
four quotes (all rhyming on -īn(a)) with the text’s rhyming prose:

God the most High said […] “And We sent thee not, save as a mercy upon the
worlds.” (21:107) And He said to [the Prophet] after reminding him of a group of
prophetic leaders, exhorting and inciting us towards imitating them: “They are those
whom God has guided so follow their guidance.” (6:90) And he admonished
(khāṭaba) his servants, the best undiluted companions, saying: “O you who believe!
Take not Mine enemy and your enemy as friends.” (60:1) And he said to them in the
manner of guidance and demonstration: “O you who believe! Take not Jews and
Christians as protectors. They are the protectors of one another. And whosoever
takes them as protectors, surely he is of them. Truly God guides not wrongdoing
people. Yet thou seest those in whose hearts is a disease hastening to them, saying,
‘We fear lest a change of fortune should befall us.’ It may be that God will grant victory, or a command from Him. And then they shall be remorseful for that which they
49

al-Nafāʾis, 62. I have added the phrases “on the one hand” and “on the other hand” to make clear that Ibn al-

Rifʿa is making a twofold command here. A few lines further he explicitly refers to two commands.
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secretly harbored in their souls.” (5:51-2)50

The first two quotes support the first injunction to follow the practice of the Prophet and
“those whom God has guided”, arguably an inverse reference to those members of the scholarly community who are on the wrong path. The second two quotes support the second injunction, moving from the unspecific to the specific and, indeed, unambiguous command to
not associate with non-Muslims. Unlike the other quotes, this last quote makes regular appearances in contemporary polemical texts.51 However, the fact that Ibn al-Rifʿa continues to
cite Q 5:52 is again ambiguous, for this verse has been interpreted as referring to “hypocrites” who “attempted to ‘hedge their bets’ by establishing supportive alliances with those
outside of the Muslim community who would protect them if the community suffered adversity.”52 This last interpretation especially underlines Ibn al-Rifʿa’s subtle critique. While he
refrains from explaining his choices of citations, his intended audience would have been one
well versed in uṣūl al- qh and would presumably have been able to interpret the import of
these citations.

50

al-Nafāʾis, 62.
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See, for example: Ghāzī Ibn Al-Wāsiṭī, “An Answer to the Dhimmis," ed. R. Gottheil, Journal of the American

Oriental Society 41 (1921), 387 (Arabic text) and 417 (translation, misidentified as 5:56); M. Perlmann (ed.),
“Asnawi’s Tract Against Christian Officials," in Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, 2 vols., ed. S. Lowinger (Jerusalem, 1959), 2:180 (p. 6 in Arabic numbering of edition); Gril, “Une émeute," 254 (Ibn Nūḥ al-Qūṣī); Ibn Taymiyya & B. O’Keeffe (transl.) “Mas’alat al-Kanâ’is (The Question of the Churches)," Islamochristiana 22
(1996), 77.
52 The Study Quran,
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When Ibn al-Rifʿa finally specifies the reasons that motivated him to write his treatise, he frames his opinion as a reaction against “reprehensible” or “evil” things by paraphrasing the Qurʾānic injunction regarding the ḥisba (al-amr bi‘l-maʿrūf wa‘l-nahy ʿan al-munkar, “to
command right and forbid wrong”). He ends this passage by linking the injunction to another
Qurʾānic verse (55:33):

And it has manifestly been held to be true that to proclaim (iẓhār) the good and to forbid the evil one should give free rein to [one’s indignance] (iṭlāq al-ʿinān) and [take up]
the fight against the enemies of God with arguments and proof in accordance with what
He – the most high – has stated in the perfection of the Qurʾān: “O company of jinn and
men, if you are able to pass beyond the regions of the heavens and the earth, then pass,
you shall not pass; save by a warrant.”53

The citation of Q 55:33 may seem like a peculiar choice, but the commentators have interpreted this verse as meaning that men and jinn “will never be able to evade God’s Commands
and Decrees”. The choice for this verse thus establishes a link with ḥisba as a divine command.54 Again, for the learned audience Ibn al-Rifʿa had in mind this association would not
have been lost. He finally goes on to specify what exactly should be forbidden:

53

al-Nafāʾis, 63.
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The Study Quran, 1314, referring to the tafsīr of the Syrian scholar Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373).
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And among the most reprehensible such things that the people of the two communities of unbelievers (ahl al-millatayn min al-ku fār) — that is, the impudent Jews and
Christians — have brought forth (yubdiʾu bi-hi) is their synagogues and churches in
these lands, especially in Cairo, [even though] the qāḍī and rabbinic judge (dānī)
agree that [this] is an Islamic city constructed by [the Fatimid caliph] al-Muʿizz [liDīn Allāh] in the fourth century of the Hijra of the Prophet.55

Ibn al-Rifʿa’s contention is here that the churches and synagogues of Cairo are problematic
because they cannot have been built before the foundation of the city. This observation will
prove to be of central importance for the remainder of the treatise, especially in the third aspect, but here it is immediately contrasted with an opposing opinion. This opinion and Ibn alRifʿa’s self-imposed duty to react to it forms the crux of the treatise’s argument:

But those who stubbornly resist and those who are impudent (al-muʿānidūn wa‘l-fujjār)
claim that [the churches and synagogues in Cairo] were already present before the conquest and before the peace agreement was concluded for [the area], and that it is not
permissible to renounce [the peace agreement] (yutaʿ arraḍa ilay-hi bi’l-inkār). And to
[set] that [situation right,] the poor servant asks God, the Mighty, the Gentle, the Beneficent, the Most High, the Mighty, for guidance, by the grace of his beneficent Lord.
[And this servant is] Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Rifʿa, may he be guided
rightly in deducing what the fundaments of his madhhab and the branches of his educaal-Nafāʾis, 63-64.
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tion (furūʿ muhadhdhabi-hi) require of him, that is to say, the madhhab of Imām al-Shāfiʿī, the treasured, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs, the deceased, the truth of support in the [areas
of] writing, fatwā [giving] and instruction.56

The identity of these “stubbornly resisting” and “impudent” people who claim that these
buildings are ancient and safeguarded by the peace treaty is not exactly clear. One might
identify them as non-Muslims, and this is what both Seth Ward and al-Kaʿkī have done. But
given what we know from contemporary historical sources, as well as Ibn al-Rifʿa’s own
double injunction at the outset of his introduction, and his meaningful choice of Qurʾānic citations, it makes as much sense to identify them as his scholarly peers who deduced rulings
from their legal tradition in what he considered to be incorrect ways. It follows that they were
not rightly guided. Ibn al-Rifʿa’s supplication for God’s help to apply “what the fundaments
of his madhhab […] and the branches of his education require of him” is not just a convention
then, but rather is connected to the main argument of the treatise.57 The argument has now
come full circle: the author’s invocation of God’s help in the basmallah is here strengthened
by a direct association with al-Shāfiʿī, whose authority will be central to the core legal argument.
The introduction suggests that Ibn al-Rifʿa formulated his opinion in a dialectical
form that specifically addressed other jurists whom he accused of incorrectly formulating
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al-Nafāʾis, 64-65.
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Note also that it is formulated with rhetorical stratagem of “metathetic anagrammatic paronomasia” (jinās qalb

al-baʿḍ) with the terms muhadhdhab and madhhab. On this rhetorical device, see The Arch Rhetorician, 26.
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first lines of the main text begin with a second basmallah and are also written in rhymed
prose:

The [here presented] indicant [dalīl, from which legal norms/rulings (aḥkām) should be
derived] is in response (radd) to legal claims (al-daʿwā) made in Cairo al-Muʿizziyya,
which – God willing with His help and strength – shall not make manifest to have [any]
benefit (al-latī lā yuẓhiru […] la-hā jadwā). [The indicant] is based upon the statements
of al-Shāfiʿī — may God have mercy upon him and send him along as companion of
the Text and the meaning (al-faḥwā).58

Ibn al-Rifʿa makes no mention whatsoever of the churches and synagogues in this first sentence. Of course, they had already been mentioned in the general introduction, and he discusses them again further on, especially in the fourth aspect, where the author investigates the
validity of the dhimma contract more closely, but the fact that he does not identify them here
suggests that the central issue at stake was the correct application of qh. This is also evident
from the fact that Ibn al-Rifʿa refers to an earlier ruling, to which the “indicant” (dalīl) is a
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al-Nafā’is, 65. This statement is significantly shorter in Kashf al-dasāʾis, 29r. Ibn al-Rifʿa’s regular use of short

bits of rhymed prose when introducing new ‘aspects’ (awjah) is almost entirely omitted from al-Subkī’s paraphrase.
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qh. He emphasises this point directly at the beginning of the legal discussion proper. The

response, and of which he expresses the hope that its supposed “benefits” shall not be made
manifest.
The author regularly repeats that plaintiffs must provide proof for their claims. Often
he formulates this point in a manner that highlights that he personally disagrees with the ways
in which legal rulings have been formulated. These interventions are consistently connected
to the strictly legal discussion about what al-Shāfiʿī and other prominent commentators have
written about plaintiffs and defendants. Consider, for example, the following statement, made
after the author has formulated a first major point concerning al-Shāfiʿī’s position, in which
the question is, for a first time, framed as a matter of taqlīd:

And considering al-Shāfiʿī’s method […] on the issue of the plaintiff — whose claim
should not be accepted without evidence (lā taqabbala daʿwā-hu), as the prophetic sunna
indicates — and the defendant — who does not need to [provide] evidence (al-ladhī lā
yaftaqir ilā bayyina), I say (qultu) that it is incumbent to comply with [al- Shāfiʿī’s opinion] and to follow the madhhab (al-muqallid li-madhhabi-hi), and that one should deduce
what is useful of unwritten substantive law, just as [al-Shāfiʿī’s] companions deduced
the substantive law that we follow (al-ladhī aslafnā-hu).59

59

al-Nafā’is, 69; MS al-Azhar fol. 5v. I do not follow the punctuation in al-Kaʿkī’s version, and instead read this

as a conditional sentence introduced by idh (since) and followed by the phrase starting at qultu (I say).
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The concept of taqlīd appears two times subsequently. In the first instance the author refers to
two opinions of al-Shāfiʿī on a dispute about possession:

And since it is known that al-Shāfiʿī has two opinions about this, the one who formulates an opinion is obliged to [do so in accordance with] the madhhab to which he adheres (al-muqallad la-hu).60

In a similar statement, he reiterates one of his basic contentions regarding the status of the
houses of worship in the Egyptian lands:

And if [they were built] before [the conquest], then the correct opinion—as it is related
by those transmitters (al-naqala) upon whose opinion [the correct opinion] is based in
the transmission of the [central tenets of the] law schools, which requires the [law
school’s] adherents (al-muqallidīn) to follow it and base their fatwās on it —is that the
[Egyptian] lands were conquered by force.61

The three preceding statements accord a central position to the words muqallid and muqallad,
which are linked to taqlīd, the obligation to follow established doctrines of the madhhab to

60

al-Nafā’is, 75; MS al-Azhar fol. 9r.
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al-Nafā’is, 80-1; MS al-Azhar fol. 11v.
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which one belongs.62 Taqlīd has been a subject of much debate among scholars of Islamic law,
especially in relation to ijtihād or independent reasoning. Scholars have argued that these
terms should be understood within a broad sphere of discussion and negotiation of authority
in the elaboration of qh.63 Although taqlīd was central to the practices of Islamic law for
many jurists in the post-formative period, they used it in flexible ways that should not be
evaluated as slavish imitation, as Yossef Rapoport has shown for late medieval Egypt.64 Ibn
al-Rifʿa clearly considered taqlīd of central importance in delivering a ruling. But the issue
was contested, and exactly how to adhere to binding precedent remained a point of discussion.65 Interestingly, Ibn al-Rifʿa refers to ijtihād only once: in a long discussion about the status of churches and synagogues in Basra he characterises as ijtihād the caliph ʿUmar ibn alKhaṭṭāb’s ruling concerning the status of the lands of southern Mesopotamia. Thus, Ibn alRifʿa suggests that true ijtihād was a thing of the past, and that it was incumbent on his colleagues to base rulings firmly on taqlīd, that is, by following madhhab tradition. However, Ibn

62

It has recently been translated and theorised as “binding precedent” in Talal Al-Azem’s insightful study on

“post-classical” Ḥanafī qh, Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition: Ibn Quṭlūbughā's
Commentary on the Compendium of Qudūrī (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
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The by now classic reference that sparked a re-evaluation of the distinction between taqlīd and ijtihād is: Wael

B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed?," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16 (1984), 3–41.
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Y. Rapoport, “Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlīd: The Four Chief Qāḍīs Under the Mamluks," Islamic Law

and Society, 10:2 (2003), 210-28.
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Further research on Ibn al-Rifʿa’s works, such as the large-scale Kifāyat al-tanbīh, would be needed to assess
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al-Rifʿa accuses his fellow jurists not of exercising unwarranted ijtihād, but of not exercising
taqlīd properly.66
The manner in which Ibn al-Rifʿa invokes the concept of taqlīd sheds light on the influence of social practice on juridical debate. By claiming a superior understanding of taqlīd,
Ibn al-Rifʿa was not only formulating a dialectical opinion, but also contesting the authority
of his superiors and negotiating his own position with respect to that authority. If, following
Michael Chamberlain’s use of Pierre Bourdieu’s theories, we understand knowledge as a
form of cultural capital applied in social competition, Ibn al-Rifʿa’s claim to superior knowledge of uṣūl al- qh can be seen as an application of such capital and a performance of his status as a leading jurist whose interpretation should be followed by other Shāfiʿī ʿulamāʾ.
At the end of the text, Ibn al-Rifʿa loops back to the essential features of his argument,
again in rhymed prose:

And so (wa-bi-dhālika) the answer (al-jawāb) is completed – and God knows the truth,
and to Him do we return, hoping for a light reckoning (ḥisāb). May He give abundant
reward (thawāb) and pardon in the place of reprimand, by diffusion of the Book (ʿinda
nashr al-kitāb) through which He bestows His blessings and His mercifulness. For He
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Ibn al-Rifʿa’s understanding of taqlīd seems very close to Fekry Ibrahim’s definition of ittibāʿ, or “verifiable-

following”, which involves jurists’ following precedent only after investigating the rationale behind those precedents. Considering Ibn al-Rifʿa’s engagement with the foundational texts of Shāfiʿī law, it is clear that this is
what he understood taqlīd to be. F. Ibrahim, "Rethinking the Taqlīd-Ijtihād Dichotomy: An Institutional, LongueDurée Approach,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 136:4 (2016), 801-16.
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has mastery over all things and is deserving of praise (bi‘l-ijāba jadīr). And God is sufficient for us (ḥasbunā Allāh) and [we are] trusting in [His] benefaction.

The rhyming prose reconnects these closing lines to the argument formulated at the outset.
The author refers to what he has written as an answer or response (jawāb) and uses a derived
form of this root to denote the praise due to God (ijāba), pointing to the adversarial nature of
the text — and/or to its initial status as a fatwā. He also alludes to the concept of ḥisba by using the related forms ḥisāb (reckoning) and ḥasb (sufficiency), as if supplicating God to accept
his efforts as a worthy deed of ḥisba. The term thawāb is also closely related, as it denotes
“merit [or] credit arising from a pious deed.”67 These lines thus show some of the rhetorical
depth of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise, in which he argued his point directly in legal prose and, indirectly, in rhetoric. Through this double strategy, Ibn al-Rifʿa’s argument is subtly stressed in
mutually reinforcing ways. While the legal discussion is obviously the core of the text, the
language in which it is phrased regularly draws the attention again to the issues of knowledge contestation as a divinely ordained act of ḥisba. Different audiences likely responded to
different aspects of this sophisticated textual construction, but a learned reader familiar with
the events surrounding the production of the text would surely have picked up on the message
suggested by the word choices.

The aftermath
67

H. Wehr, The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J.M. Cowan (Urbana: Spoken Language Ser-

vices, 1960), 130.
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The performative claim to superior knowledge in al-Nafāʾis is supported by the above-mentioned excerpts from chronicles. The context of disputation sketched by the historians is consistent with the tone of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise. The author addresses his arguments to his jurist
colleagues as a contestation of their formulation of substantive law.!Ultimately, however, his
efforts did not succeed, as may be inferred from the following account in al-Yūnīnī’s chronicle which follows his accounts of the sumptuary regulations, church destructions, and the
council:

[In the month of Ramaḍān (May-June, i.e. the month immediately following the
council)], the Damascene Shāfiʿī jurist and juristic adjunct (ʿadl) Najm al-Dīn
Muḥammad ibn ʿAqīl ibn Abī Ḥasan al-Bālisī was appointed to the office of deputy
judge of Fusṭāṭ (Miṣr). He was to succeed the chief judge Taqī al-Dīn ibn Daqīq alʿĪd. When he assumed the position, the qāḍī Najm al-Din Ibn al-Rifʿa was offended
(kariha) and resigned from his post as deputy judge. Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd then appointed
judge Zayn al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Sharaf al-Dīn ibn Yūnis al-Kinānī to replace Ibn alRifʿa. He assumed the post in Ramaḍān as well.68

Al-Yūnīnī does not specify why Ibn al-Rifʿa was “offended” and why he resigned, but it
seems likely that Ibn al-Rifʿa had hoped to succeed Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd and that the earlier debacle of his opinion on the churches contributed to his marginalisation. His taking up the position of muḥtasib in Fusṭāṭ indicates that at the very least he had to reorient his career. That his
68

al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl mirʾāt al-zamān, 5:464-5. My translation is based on L. Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian Histori-

ography, 180. Immediately following this report, al-Yūnīnī mentions the resignation of another deputy judge in
Cairo proper, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Saqaṭī.
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professional relationship with Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd and other ʿulamāʾ was not always easy is suggested by the following anecdotes related by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī:

When [Ibn al-Rifʿa] took up the position of deputy judge [in charge of taking care of
the financial affairs of orphans and absentees] (amānat al-ḥukm) in Egypt, a dispute
took place (waqaʿa) between him and some jurists: they testified that he entered the
fountain of the school while naked. The deputy judge al-ʿAlam al-Samannūdī decided that [Ibn al-Rifʿa’s] testimonies would no longer be acceptable (asqaṭa ʿadālatahu), [but] then a group embraced [Ibn al-Rifʿa’s] cause (taʿaṣṣaba la-hu) and brought
the case to the qāḍī. They urged him not to listen to his deputy [i.e. al-Samannūdī]
concerning this decision and to let [viz., Ibn al-Rifʿa] return to his usual state, considering that his writings testify to his thorough study in Shāfiʿī qh. When Ibn
Daqīq al-ʿĪd took up the position [of chief judge], [Ibn al-Rifʿa] stayed on as deputy
judge until something happened and he removed himself, [after which] Ibn Daqīq alʿĪd did not have him return. [When the latter] was asked about [this case,] he replied,
‘I did not dismiss him.’ Then [Ibn al-Rifʿa] took up the ḥisba [i.e. became muḥtasib]
in Fusṭāṭ until he died.69
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Ibn Ḥajar’s report dates from well after Ibn al-Rifʿa’s lifetime and it is not clear where he got
this information from, but the account indicates that the memory of Ibn al-Rifʿa’s uneasy social position persisted into the following century. Neither al-Yūnīnī nor Ibn Ḥajar mentions
the exact reasons for Ibn al-Rifʿa’s resignation, but one is tempted to connect it to his failed
attempt at having his opinion on churches gain wide acceptance and its rebuttal by Ibn Daqīq
al-ʿĪd. It appears that his forceful challenge to the predominant line of reasoning among elite
ʿulamā’ concerning the churches rubbed someone the wrong way and made his position as
deputy judge untenable. While his text circulated fairly widely afterwards and was later
bound together with other texts attesting of discussions concerning the dhimma in the period
in the composite Azhar manuscript, the text was ultimately not successful in fundamentally
convincing later generations, as Taqī l-Dīn al-Subkī’s rebuttal indicates. Although further research is necessary on later legal controversies about the status of non-Muslim houses of
worship, it does appear that the specific angle of legal disputation Ibn al-Rifʿa propagated in
the treatise did not have much of an influence on later debates.
When reading Ibn al-Rifʿa’s treatise in conjunction with the historical accounts dealing with the controversy in which it participated, we are provided not just with a legal and
polemical discussion, but also with a glimpse into one agent’s social struggles in Cairo
around the turn of the eighth / fourteenth century. We gain insight into the dynamics of disputation and the production of knowledge and authority among leading ʿulamā and the ways in
which such practices were articulated in textual contexts. These insights in turn help us to
better understand texts and to consider the workings of the field of knowledge production in
which they operate. Legal contestation took place in both textual and social arenas, and authors offered widely diverging views, even though they relied on similar practices to establish
38

substantive law. To better understand the theoretical aspects of those interactions and the social practices that informed them, it is important to read texts closely and to consider the
ways in which they interact with a range of social developments.
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